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ABSTRACT 
 
The External Tank forms the structural backbone of the Space Shuttle in the launch configuration.  
Because the tank flies to orbital velocity with the Space Shuttle Orbiter, minimization of weight is 
mandatory, to maximize payload performance.  Choice of lightweight materials both for structure 
and thermal conditioning was necessary.  The tank is large, and unique manufacturing facilities, 
tooling, handling, and transportation operations were required.  Weld processes and tooling evolved 
with the design as it matured through several block changes, to reduce weight.  Non Destructive 
Evaluation methods were used to  assure integrity of welds and thermal protection system 
materials.  The aluminum-lithium alloy was used near the end of the program and weld processes 
and weld repair techniques had to be refined.  Development and implementation of friction stir 
welding was a substantial technology development incorporated during the Program.  Automated 
thermal protection system application processes were developed for the majority of the tank 
surface.  Material obsolescence was an issue throughout the 40 year program.  The final 
configuration and tank weight enabled international space station assembly in a high inclination 
orbit allowing international cooperation with the Russian Federal Space Agency.  Numerous 
process controls were implemented to assure product quality, and innovative proof testing was 
accomplished prior to delivery.  Process controls were implemented to assure cleanliness in the 
production environment, to control contaminants, and to preclude corrosion.  Each tank was 
accepted via rigorous inspections, including non-destructive evaluation techniques, proof testing, 
and all systems testing.  In the post STS-107 era, the project focused on ascent debris risk 
reduction.  This was accomplished via stringent process controls, post flight assessment using 
substantially improved imagery, and selective redesigns.  These efforts were supported with a 
number of test programs to simulate combined environments.  Processing improvements included 
development and use of low spray guns for foam application, additional human factors 
considerations for production, use of high fidelity mockups during hardware processing with video 
review, improved tank access, extensive use of non destructive evaluation, and producibility 
enhancements.  Design improvements included redesigned bipod fittings, a bellows heater, a 
feedline camera active during ascent flight, removal of the protuberance airload ramps, redesigned 
ice frost ramps, and titanium brackets replaced aluminum brackets on the liquid oxygen feedline.  
Post flight assessment improved due to significant addition of imagery assets, greatly improving 
situational awareness.  The debris risk was reduced by two orders of magnitude.  During this time a 
major natural disaster was overcome when Katrina damaged the manufacturing facility.  Numerous 
lessons from these efforts are documented within the paper. 
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6BINTRODUCTION 
The Space Shuttle’s External Tank (ET) is a highly evolved 
and optimized system that serves as the structural backbone of 
the Space Transportation System (STS) launch vehicle (Figure 
1).  Several major design changes to the ET have occurred 
since the first flight of the Shuttle 30 years ago, with emphasis 
on improving overall system payload performance, reducing 
manufacturing flow time, and improving design robustness.  
Through the process of evolving the ET design, many 
challenges were experienced and ultimately overcome by a 
very proud, resilient, and cohesive team consisting of National 
Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and Lockheed 
Martin engineers from NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) in Huntsville AL and the Michoud Assembly Facility 
(MAF) in New Orleans, LA.  The purpose of this paper is to 
provide an overview of some of the more challenging issues 
and resulting lessons learned to potentially benefit future 
launch vehicle programs such as the Space Launch System 
(SLS).  The paper provides an overview of the ET design, a 
discussion of the major structural design evolutions, innovative 
welding techniques, the debris minimization efforts that 
occurred after the Columbia accident, and several key technical 
challenges that were recently experienced and overcome. 
7BDESIGN OVERVIEW 
The ET contains and delivers propellants for the Orbiter's three main engines during the 
launch phase and serves as the structural backbone for the Orbiter and two Solid Rocket 
Boosters (SRBs) to make up the Space Shuttle flight vehicle.  The liquid oxygen (LO2) tank 
volume is 19,463 cubic feet and contains approximately 1,385,000 pounds of oxidizer.  The liquid 
hydrogen (LH2) tank volume is 52,371 cubic feet and contains approximately 231,000 pounds of 
propellant fuel.  These volumes include a 3% ullage provision. 
The ET structure must accommodate complex load paths in that the SRB thrust loads will be 
induced forward at the Intertank while the Orbiter thrust loads will be induced at aft ET/Orbiter 
attachment points.  The SRB thrust will be as high as 2.9 million pounds each at sea level and the 
Orbiter's three main engines will develop as much as 375,000 pounds thrust each at sea level. 
Three primary structures make up the ET; a LO2 tank, an Intertank, and a LH2 tank (Figure 2).  
Since the ET is the only expendable 
element of the Space Shuttle, the design 
philosophy has been to minimize active or 
moving parts.  All power, pressure, and 
purges are received from either the Orbiter 
or ground facility.  The only active 
components on the ET are the vent/relief 
valves.  All operational instrumentation is 
hardwired to the Orbiter.  The separation is 
pyrotechnically actuated.  Slosh baffles are 
mounted in the LO2 tank and the LH2 tank 
has a vortex baffle to dampen fluid motion 
and minimize liquid residuals.  Both tanks 
contain liquid level sensors for propellant 
loading control. 
Figure 1: STS on Pad 
Figure 2: ET Primary Structures 
 
 
Both tanks are constructed of aluminum alloy skins with support or stability frames as 
required, and their skins are welded to provide reliable sealed joints.  The sidewalls and end 
domes require the largest available width of plate stock.  The Intertank structure utilizes skin 
stringers with stabilizing frames.  The primary structural attachment to the Orbiter consists of one 
forward and two aft connections, and the primary structural attachment to each of the two SRBs 
also consists of one forward and three aft connections.  Structural design of the ET is complicated 
by the fact that interactive load effects emanating from internal propellants and pressures, and 
external aerodynamic pressures and heating must be accommodated.  Additional loads 
associated with the attached Orbiter and SRBs must also be provided for structurally. 
The ET contains all the LH2 and LO2 for the Orbiter's main engines.  The propulsion system 
serves the primary function of delivering this oxidizer and fuel to and from the propellant tanks 
and Orbiter interface through 17 inch feedline disconnects.  Delivery rates to the Orbiter are 
typically 45,300 gpm for LH2 and 17,000 gpm for LO2. 
The propulsion subsystems designed to accomplish this and other required functions are the 
LO2 feedline subsystem, LO2 and LH2 pressurization and vent/relief subsystems, and the 
Intertank and tank environmental control subsystems. 
All controls and valves for the main propulsion system's operation - except for the LO2 and 
LH2 vent/relief valves, check valves in the helium inject line, and those valves integral to the 
interface disconnects - are located in the Orbiter and during prelaunch operations in the Facility.  
Propellants are loaded (and off-loaded, if required) through the Orbiter.  Loading rates can reach 
12,000 gpm for the LH2 and up to 5,000 gpm for LO2. 
The electrical system provides instrumentation sensors, heaters, lightning protection, and 
associated cabling.  All electrical power is derived from the Orbiter except for heater power which 
is provided by the ground facilities. 
 The ET thermal protection system (TPS) is applied to the external surfaces to maintain the 
cryogenic propellant quality, to protect the structure from ascent and plume heating, and to 
minimize ice/frost formation.  TPS is applied to 16,750 square feet and accounts for 
approximately 4,000 pounds of the ET weight.  Three primary materials are used on the ET.  BX-
265, NCFI 24-57, and NCFI 24-124 Spray-On Foam Insulation (SOFI) are the primary cryogenic 
insulations; and SLA 561 is the primary ablator.  Minor quantities of other foams are used for 
closeouts and MA25S ablator is used for a highly heated local areas. 
8BDESIGN AND MANUFACTURING EVOLUTION 
 
UET STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION TO SUPPORT PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 
The ET has experienced several major design changes to meet the various mission 
requirements and mission phases of the STS.  The robust, initial design often referred to as the 
Standard Weight Tank (SWT) or Heavy Weight Tank (HWT) design has served as the foundation 
for a ‘building block’ approach used to develop lighter weight, more producible designs.  The two 
(2) major redesigns are commonly referred to as the Lightweight Tank (LWT) and the Super 
Lightweight Tank (SLWT).  In addition to the performance benefits derived from the LWT and 
SLWT tanks, the SLWT design was further evolved to mitigate producibility issues that resulted 
from configuration and material changes (mainly fusion welding of aluminum-lithium (Al-Li) alloy).  
The producibility enhancements were staged incrementally starting with ET-122 to minimize 
performance impacts.  The final phase of the producibility enhancements was first implemented 
on ET-134 (STS-130) and flown on the final tank, ET-138 (STS-135). 
Structural verification of the baseline SWT included three major test programs that would 
serve as the foundation for future designs:   
 
 
1. Instrumented Structural Test Article (STA)  
2. Ground Vibration Test Article (GVTA) 
3. Main Propulsion Test Article (MPTA) 
These tests provided the data that enabled weight reduction through elimination of 
components and materials, resizing of material thicknesses, and substitution of materials for 
lighter weight materials.  The initial design leveraged the analytical models and test data obtained 
from the Saturn SI-C and Titan programs, but as test data became available from ET verification 
test programs, as well as further design environment refinements, some conservatisms were 
incrementally reduced allowing for optimized structural margins of safety.   
1981 – 1983 1983 – 1998 1998 - 2011 
Standard Weight Tank (SWT) Light Weight Tank (LWT)  Super Light Weight Tank 
(SLWT) 
~77,000 lb ~66,000 lb ~58,500 lb 
6 flown 86 flown 43 flown 
First flown:  STS-1, April 12, 
1981 
First flown:  STS-6, April 4, 
1983 
First flown:  STS-91, June 2, 
1998 
 Additional performance 
required for Galileo mission 
Additional performance 
required for 51.6 degree 
inclination missions for 
International Space Station 
(ISS) 
Table 1:  ET Design and Weight Evolution 
UET STRUCTURAL DESIGN DRIVERS 
The ET is the central, integrating element of the Shuttle system, subject to thrust loads from 
SRBs and SSMEs in flight, and loads from the Orbiter (weight, winds, etc) on the launch pad.  
The ET also has to allow for flexure due to cryogenics and ullage pressures.  ET attachments for 
the Orbiter and SRBs, and supports for other required pipes and cable trays introduce point loads 
with bending stresses, in addition to the pure membrane stresses of a pressure vessel, and result 
in stress discontinuities.  
Since the ET reaches near orbital speed (~16 ft/sec less than orbital speed) ET weight 
translates directly into payload weight, so a lightweight efficient design is essential.  This leads to 
design optimization and strict weight control for all tank systems.  The key design features and 
requirements of the ET are: 
1. An Intertank (or interstage) is required to join the LO2 and LH2 tanks due to thrust transfer 
requirements from the two SRBs and design simplicity. 
2. Vehicle controllability dictates that that LO2 tank is located at the front of the ET due to 
the weight of the oxidizer. 
3. The LO2 tank forward end is capped by an ogive shape (formed by an arc of a circle, of 
612 inch radius, rotated about the longitudinal (or X) axis of the tank) for aerodynamic 
considerations. 
4. Elliptical domes cap off the aft of LO2 tank, and both ends of the LH2 tank. 
5. Slosh baffles for LO2 are required as determined by guidance, navigation and control 
analysis to damp out any destabilizing oscillations of the LO2. 
6. Tank volume supplies fuel to the SSMEs at the required inlet net positive suction 
pressure (NPSP).   
The LO2 tank and the LH2 tank rate of delivery was developed using trajectory simulations 
that considered the properties of the fuels at cryogenic temperatures.  The LH2 fuel is fed to the 
engines at the rate of 45,283 gpm at a temp of -423°F and the LO2 oxidizer at 16,800 gpm at a 
 
 
temp of -297ºF.  The NPSP requirements were used to define the tank ullage pressures and 
subsequently the tank cylinder wall thickness.  The dome and ogive wall thicknesses were sized 
to prevent any radial deformation mismatch, and to preclude any bending stresses at cylinder/end 
closure interfaces.  
Light Weight Tank (LWT) Design Changes to Improve Performance 
Design development of the LWT was initiated prior to the first flight of the Space Shuttle.  A 
lighter weight tank was required to support manifest planning of the Galileo spacecraft in the early 
1980s.  The light weight tank design (Figure 3) was achieved through a series of modifications 
that were enabled through test calibrated model refinement, operational enhancements and a 
method to tailor margins.  These enhancements provided the foundation to resize structural 
membranes, elimination of hardware elements (e.g. thermal protection system, development flight 
instrumentation, the anti-geysering line), and material substitutions that were critical to achieving 
the desired weight reduction of 6000 lbs.  Verification of the LWT design was accomplished 
primarily with STA-based analysis and proof test of the first production article.  Approximately 
5,380 lbs were reduced through the structural redesign for the LWT. 
 
 
1. LO2 TANK 
The net weight reduction for the LO2 tank was negligible (-5 lbs) due to the increase in the 
LO2 forward ogive membranes.  The forward ogive structural redesign increased the membranes 
to preclude buckling during the cryo loading operations.  For the SWT, operational constraints 
were levied that required a 1.7 psig backpressure during the cryo loading operations to preclude 
buckling.  Weight savings was achieved by reducing the forward ogive bulkhead and cover plate 
web thickness, decreasing the aft ogive, barrel panel, and aft dome membrane thickness and 
reducing the dome and dome weld land membranes.   
 
 
     
 
Figure 3:  Structural Changes for LWT 
 
 
2. INTERTANK 
High margins on the Intertank structure were the primary reason for the weight reduction in 
the Intertank structure.  The Intertank skin / stringer panels, main frame, the SRB thrust beam 
frame (or crossbeam), and the intermediate frames were resized to maintain the factor of safety 
with sufficient margin.  In addition to these changes, additional weight savings was achieved 
through resizing other components such as thrust fittings, internal attachment, frame stabilizers 
and splice plates.  The net savings for the Intertank was ~1,200 lbs.  These changes were 
verified by test-correlated analysis. 
3. LH2 TANK 
The most significant weight reduction was achieved through redesign of the LH2 tank 
resulting in a weight savings of ~3,285 lbs.  The major credit for the savings can be attributed to 
elimination of stabilizing frames (5) and barrel stringers, resizing barrel panel membranes, and 
resizing inner and outer chord and web thickness.  The optimized design was verified by STA-
correlated analysis, proof test, and a limit load test. 
4. INTERFACE HARDWARE 
In addition to the tank structural changes, the interface hardware was redesigned to achieve 
additional weight savings. The interface hardware is where the ET attaches to the other shuttle 
elements (Orbiter and SRBs).  The attach points are:  Forward ET/Orbiter bipod attachment; 
Forward ET/SRB thrust attachments (2); Aft ET/Orbiter attachments (2); Aft ET/SRB attachments 
(2 upper and 2 lower).  The loads at the interfaces were revised by the integration contractor 
enabling structural hardware resizing and material substitution for some hardware.  The total 
weight savings of 823 lbs was primarily achieved through redesign of the thrust struts and end 
fittings, the aft crossbeam, and the aft ET/Orbiter attachment ball fittings.  Although not 
considered structural changes, significant weight savings were also achieved by deletion of the 
antigeysering lines, development flight instrumentation, and the white paint covering the TPS. 
SUPER LIGHT WEIGHT TANK (SLWT) DESIGN CHANGES TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE 
Design and certification of the SLWT was a critical turning point in the Space Shuttle 
Program’s ability to support construction of the International Space Station (ISS).  A target of 
7,500 lbm reduction was required to achieve the 51.6° orbital inclination with an ISS payload.  
Several challenges were identified early in the program: 
• Aggressive schedule to support ISS program 
• Parallel development of a lightweight Al-Li material, and associated  manufacturing 
processes, and design 
• Structural verification program constrained by funding and schedule 
• Dedicated full-scale, cryogenic structural tests not planned 
• Significant production impacts caused by Al-Li alloy weld-related rework 
• Design and production development parallel with production of traditional LWTs 
The SLWT used Al-Li alloys in place of traditional Al 2219 at several locations on the LO2 and 
LH2 Tanks.  Aluminum-lithium (Al-Li) alloys offer the benefit of improved yield strength, stiffness, 
and reduced density.  The use of this state of the art alloy required an extensive material test 
program to determine material allowables, weld land sizes, and manufacturing processes / 
requirements.  The most significant configuration change for the SLWT was the use of Al-Li 2195 
orthogrid barrel panels in place of the Al 2219 T-stiffened panels used for SWT and LWT 
configurations.  The use of orthogrid wall construction for the LH2 tank required development of 
new manufacturing process for machining, forming, and welding of barrel assemblies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To address the design and manufacturing challenges, the ET Project had to engage industry 
experts, leverage all available resources and existing data bases, develop innovative designs to 
optimize performance, develop innovative material and acceptance programs, and evolve the 
design to mitigate production issues.  A special Structural Verification Team was convened to 
resolve the challenges associated with design certification of the SLWT.  The team established a 
verification approach that was crucial to the success of the SLWT within the budget and schedule 
constraints levied by NASA. 
Figure 5:  Comparison of SWT / LWT to SLWT LH2 Tank Barrels 
Figure 4:  Structural Changes for SLWT 
 
 
Verification Groundrules and Philosophy 
• Verification is demonstrated by either test or flight history of the ET 
• Test verify the structural integrity of each element 
• Test demonstrate that each element will withstand ultimate load 
• No test is required if a more critical and similar element has been tested 
• All test articles require production material, processes, and tooling 
• Deviations may be acceptable based on case by case rationale 
• Test completion is prerequisite to flight or critical design condition 
The result was an innovative, multi-faceted verification program including verification data 
obtained from:  1) Existing data base; 2) Component tests; 3) Independent analysis, and 4) 
aluminum-lithium test article (ALTA). 
 
 
1) UExisting Data BaseU – The team utilized a wealth of test and flight data from the SWT and 
the current LWT program.  Key outcomes were: 
• Maintained existing frame stiffness, thus protecting applicability of the SWT general 
stability test 
• Maintained LWT thicknesses in areas where testing was not reasonable given the 
program constraints (Example: LO2 tank aft ogive regions critical for flight stability) 
2) UComponent Testing U– The component test program targeted specific designs and/or 
material changes.  All tests were performed to capability.  A total of 13 different 
subassembly tests were performed, many with 2 or more articles of different 
configurations. Examples: Intertank skin-stringer/joint compression tests, frame beaded 
web tests, cryogenic environments test. 
3) UIndependent AnalysisU – The test-based ground rule was deviated from in two cases:  LO2 
tank aft ogive and barrel in areas critical for unpressurized pre-launch stability and aft end 
of the Intertank thrust panel critical for staging stability.  Deviations were allowed on a 
case-by-case basis if the analytical factor of safety > 2.0 was maintained (vs. the required 
design factor) and additional independent analysis was performed and correlated to test 
results.  The SLWT independent analysis was performed by MSFC and Langley Research 
Center.   
4) UAluminum Lithium Test Article (ALTA)U – The ALTA included two major pieces of SLWT 
hardware:  A barrel section representative of the LH2 Tank barrels 3 and 4 as well as 
panels on the -Z and +Y axis of barrels 1 and 2 and a LO2 Tank aft dome.  ALTA provided 
Figure 6:  SLWT ET Structural Verification Approach 
 
 
the key element in the verification of the SLWT.  It demonstrated the strength of the LH2 
barrels, stability allowable and stability capability of the LH2 tank orthogrid panels, and the 
stability allowable of LO2 aft dome.   
The loads applied to ALTA consisted of pneumatic pressurization, axial loads, bending 
moments and shear loads, and water and high density fluid (HDF) aft dome fill (HDF=35 
lb/gal).  The ALTA verified the adequacy of the LO2 dome and the robust design of the 
orthogrid barrel panels for the general stability failure mode.  In general, the ALTA 
demonstrated greater than ultimate load and the orthogrid barrel section was tested to failure 
at levels equivalent to twice the design limit load. 
 
 
 
In addition to the ALTA structural verification test, the team determined every LH2 tank would 
be protoflight tested to 115% design limit load for the general shell buckling stability failure mode 
for two locations not included in the ALTA test program:   
1. Longeron region in the LH2 tank Barrels 1 and 2 affected by the Orbiter thrust loads.  
These loads are transferred to the ET by the aft thrust struts which are attached to the 
integral longerons. 
2. LH2 Aft Dome which is affected by loading induced through the aft ET/SRB attach 
struts.  These loads occur as the LH2 tank undergoes thermal shrinkage during the 
prelaunch fueling process.   
SLWT-1 was heavily instrumented during the initial protoflight testing and provided excellent 
correlation to analytical predictions.  The data continued to add to the database used to further 
evolve the design. 
SLWT DESIGN CHANGES TO IMPROVE PRODUCTION 
There were significant challenges associated with the weld process development required for 
the Al 2195 material implementation associated with the complex curvature welds (ellipsoidal 
domes & ogives).  A productivity enhancement study was initiated to identify Al 2195 weld risk 
mitigation candidates.  The plan included a return to Al 2219 for the complex curvature hardware, 
which required a staged implementation approach in order to mitigate performance and hardware 
Figure 7:  SLWT Al-Li Test Article 
 
 
availability issues.  The design and structural verification plan was reviewed and approved by the 
Structural Verification Committee and various NASA Level II technical panels.  The verification 
committee included the majority of the members from the original SLWT Verification Team. 
Verification of the redesigned SLWT structure leveraged the data obtained during the initial 
SLWT verification including use of test-based FEM analysis correlated to SWT, LWT and SLWT 
major structural tests.  The acceptance proof and protoflight tests performed on each tank 
continued to provide a solid element of the verification process. 
 
 
 
Key Lessons Learned during the SLWT Tank Development 
• Engage industry experts early in design verification cycle  
• Verification program should be test-based and failure mode specific  
• Tests to design capability are critical to understand margins  
• Tests should be performed incrementally to reduce program risk  (component – large scale – 
acceptance)  
• Protoflight tests can be used when ultimate load tests not practical  
• Independent analyses can be used to extend test-based data for similarity verification  
• Leverage all previous test, analysis, and engineering experience data to the fullest extent to 
minimize risk  
• Designs should ‘evolve’ to more exotic material and manufacturing  
9BINNOVATIVE WELDING TECHNIQUES DEMONSTRATED ON THE ET 
As discussed previously, the ET consists of three major components: the forward LO2 tank, 
an unpressurized Intertank, and the aft LH2 tank.  The ET pressure vessels require more than 
one-half mile of welding to join together the aluminum panels that form the LO2 and LH2 tanks.   
Initially, the aluminum alloy used for the majority of the SWT and later for the LWT was Al 
2219, a well characterized material documented in MIL-Handbook-5.  The initial welding process, 
Figure 8:  SLWT Production Enhancements 
 
 
gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW) or the colloquial term tungsten inert gas welding (TIG), had 
also been used on Saturn 1C (S-1C) with Al 2219 (Figure 9).  This allowed for an extensive 
welding database at MSFC for ET design use.  Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) also had 
extensive usage history with Al 2219 and the GTAW process on the Titan II & III programs at their 
Denver operations. 
 
 
The greatest change from the S-1C historical data for ET welding use was in the selection of 
the welding position to be used.  The S-1C welding had been performed mainly in the 3 o’clock 
position, rotating the hardware as needed for access.  The MMC tooling designers wanted to 
minimize parts handling and the welding personnel to optimize torch attitude.  The position 
selected for ET welding was vertical up or flat, moving the torch rather than the hardware for the 
majority of the welding.  A typical representation of a GTAW torch is shown in Figure 9 above.   
The three “all up” test series:  the Structural Test Articles (STA), the GVTA, and the MPTA 
were all built using Al 2219 material and were welded using the GTAW process.  A total of 7 SWT 
configured tanks completed build, including the aforementioned test articles.  The first flight tank, 
STS-1, was delivered in June 1979 and was subsequently launched on April 12, 1981.   
During the build cycle on STS-1, NASA issued a directive to lighten the ET by a minimum of 
6,000 pounds.  Typical weight savings measures included:  deletion of the white paint on the 
thermal protective system (TPS) for a savings of 580 lbs; deletion of the Anti-geyser line from the 
design for a savings of 713 lbs; deletion of the GH2 line bracketry (GH2 line moved to utilize 
bracketry from Anti-geyser line); the cable trays were reduced in overall size; materials 
substitutions that allowed part redesign using the new properties and changes in the analytical 
methodology (margin reduction & mixed factor of safety).   These changes were implemented 
between ET-8 (LWT-1) and ET-27 (LWT-23), the latter due to material availability.   
Additionally, NASA directed the development of an alternate weld process, Variable Polarity 
Plasma Arc (VPPA) welding (Figure 10).  Typical Plasma Arc welding (no variable polarity) allows 
deposits to build up on the electrode during welding which occasionally come loose and drop into 
the weld puddle, contaminating the weld.  Variable polarity plasma arc welding, however, 
employs a variable current waveform that enables the welding system to operate for preset time 
increments in either of 2 polarity modes.  Simply stated, VPPA provides positive and negative 
Figure 9:  GTAW Process 
 
 
current reversals to clean the electrode precluding deposit build up and subsequent weld 
contamination.   Those contaminates encountered during welding are forced out the backside of 
the weld due to the plasma velocity, creating cleaner welds with less porosity.    
The variable polarity aspect also allowed for less rigorous pre-weld cleaning and edge 
preparation due to the inherent cleaning action.  Rather than capitalize on less cleaning, the ET 
manufacturing community chose to use the inherent cleaning capability of VPPA to their 
advantage by allowing for extended time between initial weld cleaning and weld startup.  The 
longer weld set up times helped to reduce joint assembly issues such as out of tolerance peaking 
and mismatch.    
Two types of plasma arc 
welding torches are shown 
in Figure 10:  a transferred 
arc type such as is typically 
used at MAF and a non-
transferred arc type for 
comparison.    
VPPA was implemented 
in a phased sequence 
based on production tool 
groups in the build process 
flow.  A notable exception 
was the longitudinal barrel 
welds in the flat or down-
hand position that remained 
GTAW due to drop-thru 
issues with the weld puddle.    
The design was re-
designated as the Light 
Weight Tank (LWT).  
Subsequent opportunities 
for improved computer 
control systems for the 
equipment were pursued to 
update MAF to the state of 
the art for automated weld 
systems.   
When the Space Station made the decision to change their orbital inclination from 28.50 to 
51.60 to enable the Russians to launch directly to the station, the higher orbital inclination reduced 
the Shuttle payload capability by 13,500 lbs.  The ET was requested to make up a portion of this 
payload loss.  To this end, ET proposed to eliminate 7,500 lbs by using material substitution and 
selected component re-designs.  The material substitution utilized the aluminum-lithium alloy 
developed by Lockheed Martin under the name of Weldalite – 30% stronger and 5% less dense 
than the prior Al 2219 material.  As discussed earlier, the re-designed tank became known as 
“Super Lightweight” or SLWT.   
Reynolds Aluminum (who had bought the material production rights), Lockheed Martin, and 
MSFC Materials and Processes (M&P) teamed together to handle materials issues and 
verification activities for the aluminum-lithium material that came to be known as Al 2195.  The 
Lockheed Martin and MSFC M&P groups also worked weld development and implementation.   
Figure 2. Plasma Arc Welding Torch Configuration  
Figure 10:  VPPA Welding 
 
 
Along with the primary base metal change to Al 2195, the weld wire changed from Al 2319 to 
Al 4043, a high silicon content wire.  The change was required as a reduction in weld tensile 
strength at cryogenic conditions was observed with welds created in Al 2195 with Al 2219.  Also, 
the Al 4043 was more welder friendly for weld repairs.   
During weld development, an issue was encountered that dealt with weld shielding.  
Typically, aluminum only requires shielding on the front side of the weld over the molten puddle.  
The backside of the weld skins over and lightly drops thru to form a rounded root bead that flows 
smoothly into the plate.  However, welds on Al 2195 welded in the same manner displayed 
excessive suck back, cutting, and oxidation, without root bead drop thru.  It was determined that 
Al 2195 required an inert gas purge both on the front and back side of the weld to ensure proper 
weld formation.  Developing tools which could provide a backside shield and accommodate the 
plasma torch blowing through the material (a characteristic of VPPA) caused multiple tool re-
design challenges.   
Another issue with VPPA welding of Al 2195 was that the down-hand weld position created 
too much drop through, especially for weld land thicknesses of 0.320 inches or greater.  The 
plasma torch would actually blow the weld puddle out of the seam.  This affected the welds on 
LH2 barrels 2, 3, and 4 as performed on the existing 5016 tool.  Similarly, the dome gore welds 
that transitioned from vertical up at the weld start to down-hand welding at the end of the weld 
(top of dome near cap weld) experienced excessive drop thru and cutting action as the welds 
progressed to a full down-hand position.   
A hybrid weld technique was developed to handle this issue: Soft plasma arc welding 
(SPAW).  This process utilized a VPPA seal pass to lay down wire for mixing during the 
penetration pass.  The penetration pass was a modified TIG or GTAW pass, without wire 
addition.  A final VPPA cover pass was applied to cap the weld.  The TIG penetration pass could 
and did create acceptable welds.  However, the heat input still had to be closely monitored to 
restrict root bead drop thru amounts.   
While welding with Al 4043 weld wire was more forgiving than welding with Al 2319 weld wire, 
it was found that the welds were not as strong.  If multiple repairs were performed, the 
concentration of the Al 4043 would build up until the repair area was almost pure Al 4043.  The 
weld strength decreased to a point which failed to support the design load conditions and Factor 
of Safety requirements.  The weld lands had to be resized to account for the loss in weld strength.   
Repair weld residual stress accumulation also affected repair weld properties.  As repairs 
were made on Al 2195, the repair weld shrinkage stress from each repair increased and became 
trapped within the repair.  When loaded, the repair area failed to redistribute the load to the 
surrounding “good” weld, cracking instead.  It was found that repair welding caused an equiax 
zone of extremely brittle material surrounded by a continuous secondary phase.  Repeated 
repairs caused this zone to grow until the residual stress from the weld shrinkage exceeded the 
strength of the weld repair causing it to fail.   
An approach was developed to mitigate the concentration of residual stress in Al 2195 weld 
repairs.  A process was developed where the repair area bead and a portion of the adjacent 
original weld bead were planished (to toughen and smooth the surface of a metal by hammering 
or rolling it from both sides simultaneously), forcing the bead back into the joint.  The joint 
spreads out, there by substantially reducing the recorded shrinkage and associated residual 
stress.  Planishing activities, however, may form other cracks leading to additional weld 
repair/planish cycles prior to achieving an acceptable weld repair.   
The welding team demonstrated that planishing weld repairs did indeed increase the weld 
repair properties and weld performance capabilities.  The vehicle for the demonstration was an 
innovation for the SLWT program and it entailed the use of “wide panels”.  Wide panel tensile 
specimens were configured to contain full size repairs with the restraint of surrounding non-
 
 
repaired material to retain the residual stresses.  The configuration allowed for load redistribution 
to be assessed during test.  Nonplanished vs. planished samples were tested using photo stress 
material to show load redistribution.  Figure 11 compares wide panel test articles with and without 
planishing.  The typical wide panel configuration started with a 20 inch wide panel (weld length) 
and an overall length of 52 inches. 
 
 
 
Unplanished 114% Recovery 
Material:  2195/4043 Repair Level:  R5 Stress Applied:  20 ksi 
 
A second generation SLWT design was initiated to remedy several of the welding issues that 
occurred during the first generation SLWT design and build.  The initial effort was to convert the 
LH2 domes and LO2 dome base material back to Al 2219.  Minimal part redesign allowed for the 
new Al 2219 domes to remain lighter in weight than the previous LWT design.  The welding 
process reverted to the standard LWT VPPA process which produced cleaner welds than the 
SLWT SPAW process.  The LO2 tank forward ogive also reverted to Al 2219 and the VPPA weld 
process.  These changes (as shown in Figure 8) were phased in beginning with ET-122.   
Al 2195 made the initial welds of the ET far more complex.  Repair welds were difficult to 
make and had lower mechanical properties.  This drove up production costs.  Enter friction stir 
welding (FSW) as the most recent upgrade to the ET.  FSW utilizes frictional heating combined 
with forging pressure to produce high-strength bonds virtually free of defects.  FSW transforms 
the metals from a solid state into the “plastic-like” state, and then mechanically stirs the materials 
together under pressure to form a welded joint.  As a result, weld joints are more efficient, yielding 
80% of the base metal strength.  Fusion welding averages 40-50% of the base metal’s strength.  
The typical FSW process:  a pin tool is rotated between 180 to 300 revolutions per minute, 
depending on the thickness of the material.  The tip of the pin is forced into the material at 5000 
to 10,000 lbs per square inch of force.  The pin tool continues rotating and moves forward at a 
rate of 3.5 to 5 inches per minute.  As the pin tool rotates, friction heats the surrounding material 
& rapidly produces a softened “plasticized” area around the pin.  As it travels forward, the material 
behind the pin is forged under pressure from the shoulder of the pin tool & consolidates to form a 
bond.  Unlike fusion welding, no actual melting occurs in this process and the weld is left in the 
same fine grained condition as the parent metal.    
One of the early drawbacks was the fixed pin tool configuration because it limited welding to 
materials with a constant thickness.  This impacts the welding of the LH2 tank longeron welds 
which contain multiple thicknesses over the weld length.  Therefore, a through-spindle retractable 
Figure 11: Comparison of Stress State of Unplanished vs. Planished Al 2195 Repair 
Build up of Residual Stress at ends of repair 
Planishing reduces Residual Stress at ends of repair 
 
 
pin tool was developed that can retract or expand its pin tip within the material.  Figure 12 shows 
a Fixed Pin Tool and a Retractable Pin Tool.   
A benefit of FSW is that it has fewer process elements to control.  In a fusion weld, there are 
many process factors that must be controlled – such as purge gas, voltage & amperage, wire 
feed, travel speed, shield gas, arc gap, etc.  Whereas, in FSW there are only 3 process variables 
to control: rotation speed, travel speed, and pressure.  The increase in joint strength combined 
with the reduction in process variability provides for an increased safety margin & greater degree 
of reliability over conventional fusion welding.   
FSW was introduced on ET-132 LH2 barrels 3 and 4 for the linear welds.  At ET-134, the LO2 
barrel and all LH2 barrels (1, 2, 3, & 4) were completed using FSW.  One additional material 
change occurred at ET-134.  The LO2 aft ogive reverted to Al 2219 and the VPPA weld process.   
 
 
The timeline for implementation of the various changes for the ET is shown in Table 2.   
Month/Year Description of Activity 
1/1972 President Nixon approves 3 element Space Shuttle 
9/1973 NASA awards Martin Marietta Corporation design, development, & test of ET 
5/1976 First ET test article (MPTA-098) assembled 
7/1977 Fabrication begins on first Flight ET 
9/1977 First ET test article (MPTA-098) delivered to NASA for test  
12/1977 First ET tanking test conducted 
6/1979 First ET delivered to NASA, STS-1 known as a Standard Weight Tank (SWT) 
1/1980 NASA issues directive to lighten ET by at least 6,000 lbs 
6/1980 Implementation of Light Weight (LWT) Design decreasing tank weight by 10,000 lbs 
4/1981 First Space Shuttle flight (STS-1 @ 77,099 lbs empty) 
Figure 12: Friction Stir Weld Schematic and Macro Comparison 
                               Fixed Pin Tool                 Retractable Pin Tool  
 
 
Month/Year Description of Activity 
  Development of VPPA 
11/1981 STS-2 Flight (SWT) 
  Development of VPPA 
3/1982 First ET to fly without white paint on TPS (STS-3) weight savings 580 lbs 
6/1982 First ET to fly without anti-geyser line (STS-4) weight savings 713 lbs 
4/1983 First Light Weight flight, STS-6 (65,500 lbs empty) weight savings 
1/1994 Implementation of VPPA 
6/1983 STS-7 is last SWT flight (77,000 lbs empty) 
8/1983 STS-8 Flight using first LWT configuration 
1/1986 51L Challenger Accident 
9/1988 Return to Flight with STS-26 LWT configuration 
3/1993 Development of Al-Li by LM, Reynolds Metals, MSFC Huntsville 
2/1995 Initiate fabrication of ALTA (Aluminum Lithium Test Article)  
6/1995 Initiate fabrication of ET-96/STS-91, first Super Light Weight Tank using Al-Li (SLWT) 
5/1996 Implementation of SPAW 
10/1997 First mating of major components using Al-Li alloy 
1/1998 First SLWT tank, ET-96/STS-91 delivered to NASA 
6/1998 First SLWT tank flight ET-96/STS-91 with Discovery (58,500 lbs empty) 
6/2000 
Implement change back to Al 2219 on LO2 & LH2 Domes, LO2 fwd ogive at 
ET122/STS-134 
2000? Weld first FSW on LH2 barrel 3 & 4 (ET132/STS-128)  
1/2003 Columbia breaks up on re-entry 
7/2005 ET-121/STS-114 with Discovery marks the Return to Flight 
8/2009 First flight using FSW barrels (ET-132/STS-128) 
2/2010 ET-134/STS-130 flight with all FSW barrels (LH2 & LO2) 
8/2011 Final Flight:  ET-138/STS-135 with Atlantis 
Table 2:  ET Timeline:  Welding Changes 
The MAF production facility was divided into 
three distinct manufacturing areas called Weld 
Sub-Assembly (WSA) 1, 2, and 3.  This allowed 
common manufacturing documentation for 
individual sub-assemblies required to complete 
either the LO2 or LH2 tank.  WSA-1 provided the 
tooling to manufacture domes, a forward and aft for 
the LH2 Tank as well as a single dome for the LO2 
tank; WSA-2 provided the tooling to complete 
Barrels, T-rings, and ogives; WSA-3 provided the 
tooling required to integrate the individual sub-
assemblies into completed pressure vessels.  
Additional support hardware welding such as 
feedline and crossbeam welds were also a part of a 
WSA-2 remote area.   
The LH2 and the LO2 tanks are shown in a flat 
profile in Figures 13 and 14.  This allows a birds-
eye view of the individual sections and welds 
required to complete each pressure vessel build.    
Figure 13: LH2 Tank Weld Layout 
 
 
Following completion of each sub-assembly, each weld was inspected for defects.  In order to 
denote where a defect was found, the inside and outside surfaces of the tanks needed to be 
identified.  The naming convention for the exterior surface was outer skin line while the interior 
surface was the inner skin line.  Typical inspections included: 1) visual inspection to check for 
peaking and mismatch due to the weld as well as for non-conforming weld configurations; 2) 
radiography to check for defects internal to the weld; 3) liquid penetrant inspection to determine if 
any defects such as cracking or laps were open to the surface. When defects were found, repair 
practices such as sanding, grinding, and weld heat repairs were performed.  Subsequent to any 
repair practice, the area worked was re-inspected to assure that the existing defect was removed 
and that no new defects were introduced. 
 
 
10BPOST COLUMBIA ET THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM DEBRIS MITIGATION 
Following the Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 the main focus for the ET Project was to 
minimize the debris produced by the ET during flight.  The main forms of debris produced by the 
ET included ice and various forms of insulation.  As such, the focus of design changes during the 
Return to Flight (RTF) activity was the minimization of areas that form ice and areas that lose 
insulation.  
Ice formation was present in areas where insulation or heaters could not be applied 
adequately to eliminate exposed areas below freezing due to clearance requirements or other 
limitations.  As active heating systems are complex and costly to maintain and operate, the goal 
for any post-Columbia design changes was to first look at passive methods that could eliminate or 
reduce ice.  This led to options that included changes in substrate material or configuration, 
addition of fairings or radiating fins, and/or use of different types of insulation.  When passive 
changes did not provide enough reduction of ice in high risk areas, purges or heating systems 
were pursued.  
Figure 14: LO2 Tank Weld Layout 
Fwd Ogive 
Aft Ogive 
Barrel 
Dome 
Dome Cap 
 
 
The lightweight insulation used on the ET is sensitive to how it is applied and is not very 
damage tolerant.  Therefore, post-Columbia work on the insulation targeted improved processes 
for applying the foam and increased efforts to protect the foam from damage.  The improved 
processes for applying the foam mainly targeted the reduction of subsurface voids that could form 
in the foam as it was manually applied.  A significant effort was put into spray technician training 
and recertification.  High fidelity mockups were sprayed and dissected to quantify void formation.  
This process was repeated until acceptable results were obtained, and for critical applications 
high fidelity mockups were used as witness articles in conjunction with production sprays.  The 
mockups would subsequently be tested and dissected and if unacceptable, the production spray 
would be removed and the process repeated.  Additionally, nondestructive evaluation (NDE) 
techniques were developed and applied to critical debris locations on production tanks.  
Backscatter X-ray, terahertz imaging, and shearography were used to look for subsurface 
defects.   
Areas that are subjected to cryopumping or cryoingestion accounted for the majority of the 
large foam losses from the ET, so design changes to mitigate foam loss were targeted heavily in 
areas where those conditions could exist.  Cryopumping can exist when there is a “leak path” 
from the outside air to a subsurface void that is colder than the liquefaction temperature of air 
(approx -3190F).  The air in the void will condense, creating a vacuum that will draw in more air 
that will continue to condense.  This process will continue over many hours while the filled ET sits 
on the launch pad until either the void is filled or the leak path gets sealed (e.g. freezes).  Upon 
warm-up, such as during flight, the air in the void will change back to gas but at a higher rate such 
that pressure builds up in the void causing the foam to fail and produce debris.  Since liquid 
oxygen is at -2970F and liquid hydrogen is at -4230F, cryopumping can only occur in areas on or 
immediately adjacent to the hydrogen tank.  Similarly, cryoingestion involves the same principles 
but is due to an internally fed void such as can exist near the Intertank to LH2 tank junction where 
gaseous nitrogen is used to purge the Intertank compartment.  Design changes to reduce the 
potential for cryopumping and cryoingestion included reducing voids in both the foam and 
structure, filling of gaps, holes, and wiring bundles with filler material to eliminate leak paths, 
configuration changes to simplify foam application, and tool and scaffolding changes to enhance 
manual application of foam.  Changes made to protect the insulation included new mats for 
working on or around the foam, new scaffolding to allow access to areas sensitive to foam 
damage, new guidelines for putting loads on the foam (i.e. weight limits), and new guidelines for 
accepting damage to foam.  
Although the major RTF activity which targeted debris minimization included all of the 
following changes, only a few of these (shown in bold italics) will be discussed here in more 
detail: 
1. Redesign of the bipod fitting and the elimination of the insulating ramp which contributed 
to the Columbia accident. 
2. Redesign of the LO2 Feedline brackets to reduce ice and foam loss. 
3. Redesign of the LO2 Feedline bellows to reduce ice. 
4. Redesign of the LH2 to Intertank flange closeout configuration to reduce foam losses. 
5. Redesign of the LH2 ice frost ramps to reduce foam losses. 
6. Eliminate the LO2 and LH2 tank protuberance air load ramps to reduce foam loss. 
7. Recertification of existing TPS foam on the tanks. 
8. Addition of an in-flight video camera to help monitor debris performance. 
1.  Redesign of the Bipod Fitting and Elimination of the Insulating Ramp 
The bipod configuration flown on the final Columbia mission (STS-107) is shown in Figure 15 
and the Return to Flight configuration is shown in Figure 16.  The original configuration had parts 
covered with a high density material called Super Light Ablator (SLA) which was there to protect 
the structure from ascent heating.  A 150 watt Calrod heater was used in the center of the spindle 
to keep the exposed end of the fitting which attached to the Orbiter strut from forming ice.  This 
 
 
entire structure (fitting, heater, wiring, ablator, and miscellaneous hardware), minus the end of the 
fitting, was covered in a ramp of manually applied foam insulation to prevent ice formation and 
provide protection from ascent heating.  It was this foam ramp that came off and struck the 
Orbiter during the STS-107 Columbia mission.  As a result, the main goal for the bipod redesign 
was to eliminate this large amount of foam as a potential debris source.  Due to the direct sink to 
the LH2 tank and the necessity to have some parts bare it quickly became apparent that the new 
design would require a heater to minimize ice formation.  See Figure 17 for an exploded view of 
the bipod hardware attached to the LH2 tank for the redesign.  The final design made use of the 
original thermal isolator which was used between the LH2 tank wall and titanium fitting, the 
titanium fitting, and the internal Inconel spindle.  Major new hardware components included four 
300 Watt heaters, a copper plate with 2 blocks to hold the heaters (2 each) placed between the 
fitting and isolator to spread the heat, and a new cover for the end of the fitting not attached to the 
strut.   
                 
 
 
  
Figure 16: RTF Bipod Configuration Figure 15: STS-107 Bipod Ramp 
Figure 17: Exploded View of RTF Bipod Fitting Redesign 
 
 
Figure 18 shows the fitting after installation but 
prior to the final foam closeout.  It also shows the 
wires bonded as they exit the backside of the fitting 
and traverse over the Intertank to LH2 tank flange and 
enter the Intertank stringer on the forward side.  
Since the wires can be a reservoir for cryoingestion 
of N2 from the Intertank, the wires within 4 feet of the 
fitting were injected with a filler and bonded to the 
tank for the entire wire run on the LH2 tank side to try 
and prevent foam debris as a result of cryoingestion 
during loading and subsequent release of foam 
during drain of the LH2 tank in flight.  In addition, the 
foam closeouts around the fitting were done in steps 
to reduce void formation in the foam and around the 
complex substructure.  In some locations foam or 
paste was added to fill holes and gaps that could 
create reservoirs for cryopumping.  The paste had an 
additional function of providing better contact 
between connecting structures allowing for more 
consistent performance of the heating system. 
Due to the variations in contacts for this bipod structural stack-up and the range of weather 
conditions, the heaters were controlled based on feedback from two temperature sensors located 
on the backside of the fitting under the foam.  The requirement for this complex control system 
was verified throughout the operation of this new design where no two fittings (+Y or –Y) required 
the exact same power settings from loading to loading and throughout the loading phases.  One 
additional lesson learned with this control system was the requirement to offset the temperature 
readings.  Due to the high conductivity of the wiring and the cold sink to which they were attached 
the temperature readings were not absolute and were dependent on the type of sensor and 
placement of the sensors in the final design. 
Although foam losses still occurred occasionally in the region of the bipod fitting (and other 
locations on the hydrogen tank), post Columbia, the frequency and mass of foam loss was 
significantly reduced.  It would be very difficult to completely eliminate this potential debris source 
without moving this attach structure to a location that is not susceptible to 
cryopumping/cryoingestion.  However, with the increased in-flight video imagery post Columbia 
(namely the ET feedline camera), the time-of-release of the debris was often able to be verified 
and was found to agree with analytical predictions.  Due to the physics governing the warmup of 
the hydrogen tank, such as the predictable nature of liquid depletion, the debris events due to this 
mechanism occurred relatively late in flight when there 
would be little aerodynamic drag decelerating the debris 
relative to the orbiter.  Thus, the velocity of the debris 
impacts would be low and the risk of critical damage from 
these debris sources would likewise be acceptably low.  
2. Redesign of the LO2 Feedline Brackets 
During RTF II there was an initiative to reduce the debris 
coming from the LO2 Feedline brackets which included ice, 
foam, and possibly SLA.  These brackets attach the LO2 
feedline to the LH2 tank barrel at 5 locations and are 
designed to allow relative motion between the feedline and 
the LH2 tank during tanking/detanking cycles.  Only the first 
four brackets, shown in Figure 19, which were identical and 
pose the highest risk to the Shuttle stack were 
redesigned.  The brackets from ET-1 through ET-126 
LH2 Tank 
Intertank 
Wire run 
Figure 18: RTF Bipod Fitting Prior 
to Foam Closeout 
Figure 19: LO2 Feedline Bracket 
Locations 
 
 
were made of aluminum and were covered with both SLA for heating and foam for ice protection.  
Due to the required motion of the brackets during loading and flight and clearance requirements, 
not enough foam could be installed to completely eliminate ice formation on these brackets.  
Figure 20 shows the critical icing areas which could form ice once the tank is loaded.  Figure 21 
shows typical ice formation as observed on the pad prior to launch.  During launch, these joints 
articulate which can crack both the ice and also TPS.  Testing showed the majority of ice debris 
occurs early, just after liftoff, but the TPS debris can occur later in flight (near high dynamic 
pressure) and can pose a higher debris risk to the orbiter. 
Starting with ET-127 the 
aluminum brackets were 
replaced with redesigned 
titanium brackets which 
provided a totally passive 
ice mitigation solution.  The 
redesigned bracket takes 
advantage of titanium’s high 
strength and low thermal 
conductivity (about 10 times 
lower than aluminum) which 
allows the bracket to fly with 
less TPS foam insulation 
and more exposed metal 
than the previous design.  
By decreasing the foam 
insulation, more surface 
area of the bracket is 
exposed and heat is transferred into the bracket through convection and radiation with the 
ambient environment.  This results in a warmer overall bracket with a smaller “focused” area 
capable of producing ice during prelaunch.  Also the high strength and high temperature 
capability allowed the titanium bracket to be thinner than the aluminum configuration allowing 
more foam to be applied at the movable joints further reducing ice formation.  Test results 
showed a minimum 70% reduction in ice mass with the redesigned bracket.  Figure 22 shows the 
configuration before and after the redesign.  The new design included a no gap “slip plane” 
between the outboard side of the feedline and the top part of the bracket.  This prevented ice 
formation in this articulating joint, eliminating foam cracking and subsequent foam loss from the 
bracket top in this location (which had been shown to be a high debris risk area). 
 
 
 Figure 22: LO2 Feedline Brackets Before and After Redesign 
No gap/slip plane 
between bracket & F/L 
at outboard side of F/L 
Figure 20: Critical Icing Areas 
Subject to Motion  
Figure 21: LO2 Feedline 
Bracket Potential Debris Areas 
 
 
3. Redesign of the LO2 Feedline Bellows to Minimize Ice Formation 
The ET has 3 bellows on the LO2 feedline that runs along the LH2 tank at XT 1106, 1979, and 
2026.  Figure 23 shows the ice/frost formation that existed at the bellows opening for the LO2 
feedline at XT 1106 prior to the redesign.  Due to the location of the forward bellows relative to 
the Shuttle it was deemed the most critical location for debris liberation.  As such, Kapton strip 
heaters were installed on the LO2 feedline bellows at XT 1106 to mitigate ice accumulation, 
starting with ET-121 (STS-114). The heater strips were adhesively bonded to the inner surface of 
the outer rain shield and the outer surface of the end convolute shield as shown in Figure 24.  
Each heater strip contained independent primary and secondary circuits for redundancy. Heater 
operation was controlled by monitoring circuit voltage and current, which eliminated the need for 
temperature sensors.  The heater power to the rain shield and the convolute shield were 
approximately 30% and 70%, respectively, in order to maintain all requirements.  These 2 
surfaces needed to be warmed enough to prevent ice accumulation but not too much to affect the 
LO2 propellant running through the line or to violate the bond line temperature limit of the foam 
adhered to the outside of the two shields.  Placement of the heater on the two shields was also 
critical to the success of this redesign and as such the installation requirements were stringent.  
     
           
Original concepts to eliminate this ice included purges, an Atlas type boot, heaters, filling the 
cavity with some type of insulation, or targeted heating but all of these concepts had issues.  
Heaters were not pursued heavily in the beginning due to the active heating system required and 
initial placement of the heaters on the metal in locations that indicated the heater power was 
excessive and propellant quality would be negatively impacted.  Due to the small gap between 
the bellows shield and the convolute shield, installation of the heater was also a challenge to 
implementing a design with a heater.  
Bellows 
Figure 24: RTF LO2 Feedline  
Bellows with Heater 
Figure 23: Pre RTF LO2 Feedline  
Bellows at XT 1106 
Figure 25: Pre RTF LO2 Feedline 
Bellows OML 
Figure 26: RTF Bellows OML with 
  
 
 
While no heaters were used at XT 1979 and XT 2026 due to reduced risk of critical damage to 
the Orbiter from ice debris, the outer mold line (OML) of the foam on the bellows shield was 
redesigned to reduce the amount of ice/frost that formed at the opening by a minimum of 40%.  
Condensate run-off and the configuration of the foam on the rain shield were found to be major 
contributors to ice build-up.  The pre-RTF LO2 feedline bellows configuration of the foam is shown 
in Figure 25.  Figure 26 shows the new OML that was implemented during RTF at the 3 bellows 
locations which resulted from the addition of the foam labeled ‘drip lip’. 
4. Post-Flight Assessment Process 
Following the Return to Flight of STS-114, the ET Project institutionalized a rigorous post-flight 
assessment process.  This process formally reviewed (through engineering review boards) all 
available imagery and assessed all observations.  Debris being the main concern throughout 
ascent, the Space Shuttle Program had made major improvements in on-board imagery assets, 
and these provided much more data on foam loss than previously possible.  Post-separation 
imagery of the ET was provided by an upgraded digital camera, augmented by flash, located in 
the orbiter’s umbilical well as the orbiter maneuvered away from the ET.  Imagery of the ET was 
also taken by crew members following separation after the orbiter had maneuvered to an attitude 
that permitted the crew to view the ET through the windows.  These images would be downlinked 
to the ground generally within hours after launch to permit early assessment of debris 
performance.  These images provided the best data for where foam losses had occurred from the 
ET, and also allowed for measurements to estimate sizes and calculate debris masses.  The 
Space Shuttle Program also added video cameras to the ET (looking down the LO2 feedline, 
shown live during launch TV coverage) and to both SRBs (looking forward and aft).  The video 
imagery taken during ascent would be assessed to attempt to correlate any observations of 
debris observed in video to those locations known to have foam losses.  If a correlation was 
possible, then a time of release for that loss could be established.  The time of release of debris, 
from a known location on the vehicle, factored heavily in understanding or confirming the physical 
process (i.e. failure mode) for the debris release and hence, the understanding of the risk 
inherent in that debris source. 
Figure 27 shows a typical post-separation image, magnified to show a typical foam loss location 
(in this case an ice/frost ramp from the hydrogen tank).  Figure 28 shows a sequence of frames 
captured from the video camera on the ET feedline looking aft that shows the debris emanating 
from this location, thus establishing a time of release.  Figure 29 shows an engineering computer 
model of the loss, developed based upon the design model of the particular location and from the 
measurements made from the imagery.  This model easily enables an estimate of the mass of the 
debris to be developed. 
The ET Post Flight Assessment Team evaluated all the available data for ET generated debris.  
Estimated debris mass would be compared to masses that were known to be “possible” based on 
understanding of the particular loss location and time of release.  For those losses that exceeded 
the established limits of understanding, or for those losses that appeared to exhibit new and 
uncategorized failure modes, an In-Flight Anomaly would be assigned and the event would be 
elevated to the attention of the Program for corrective action.  The corrective action could include 
mitigation through redesign or a reassessment of the risk inherent with similar losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Post flight Image of 
Typical foam Loss 
Figure 28: video of Debirs 
Provides Time of Release 
Figure 29: Engineering 
Reconstruction of Foam Loss 
 
 
11BKey Technical Issues And Resulting Lessons Learned 
Following the Shuttle’s Return to Flight in 2006, the ET Project faced several technical 
challenges that put the entire Program at risk.  The key issues, which involved each of the 
primary systems on the ET, are listed below.  The items high-lighted by bolded italics will be 
discussed in further detail. 
• Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Cut Off Sensor Circuit Intermittent Failures 
(Electrical System) 
• Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP) GH2 Leakage (Propulsion System) 
• Intertank Stringer Cracking (Structural System) 
• ET-124 Hail Damage Recovery (Thermal Protection System) 
• Restoration of ET-122 following damage from Hurricane Katrina (All Systems) 
Each issue required an extensive investigation to identify the proximate root cause, 
establishing the necessary corrective action, and defining and executing the implementation 
plans in a way such that the impacts to the overall program milestones were minimized.  The 
following section will briefly describe each issue, the resulting corrective action, and key lessons 
learned. 
Space Shuttle Main Engine Cut Off Sensor Circuit Intermittent Failures 
Four sensors (Figure 30) are located at the bottom of the LH2 tank and serve as a back-up 
system to ensure that the SSMEs never run LO2 rich due to either a leak in the LH2 tank or issues 
within the SSMEs.  Premature depletion of LH2 would result in catastrophic explosion of the 
SSME.  Small platinum filaments are housed within each sensor (Figure 31) and are used to 
detect changes in resistance as a function of temperature.  Changes in resistance are converted 
to voltage signals which are then used by the Orbiter’s on-board computers to determine if the 
liquid level within the LH2 tank is above (“wet”) or below (“dry”) the sensor. 
  
Depletion Sensors Installed 
on Shock Mount
Figure 30: Depletion Sensor Location  
 
 
Prior to STS-129, sensor circuit anomalies (open circuit) would 
randomly occur during the filling of the LH2 tank at cryogenic 
temperature and subsequently regain functionality following tank drain 
at ambient conditions.  Previous investigations were unable to 
conclusively identify the root cause, but the decision was made to 
implement process improvements to the sensor manufacturing 
process as the sensors were deemed to be the most likely cause.  
Several flights occurred with no issues observed; but during cryogenic 
loading for the STS-129 mission, multiple sensor circuits failed 
simultaneously.  A subsequent instrumented tanking test was 
performed and isolated the fault to the feed thru connector (Figure 32).  
The specific root cause was 
determined to be the result of liquid air 
/ condensation that would form on the 
pin / socket parts on the external side 
of the feed thru connector at cryogenic 
conditions (Figure 33).  With the 
material formed on the mating 
surfaces, any relative motion between the two 
surfaces would result in an open circuit to occur at 
cryogenic temperatures which would then resume 
functionality once the 
material had melted (i.e. 
post drain ambient 
conditions).  Once the 
issue was isolated to the external mating connectors at the feed 
thru connector, the necessary corrective action was quickly 
identified and certified for flight.  The corrective action required the 
implementation of soldered connection between the pin and 
sockets to eliminate the necessary contributors to the fault (i.e. 
sliding components and contamination).  The system has worked 
flawlessly since the implementation of the corrective action.  
Key lessons learned included: 
1. Require a physics-based understanding or scenario to lead 
the investigation and corrective action plans. 
2. Group think and outside influence can confound the 
situation. 
ET-124 Hail Damage Restoration 
ET-124 suffered significant impact damage due to a freak hail 
storm while the Shuttle stack was on the launch pad prior to the 
STS-117 mission.  Over 5,000 individual impacts were incurred on 
the TPS system.  The damage required that the stack be rolled 
back to the Vertical Assembly Building for detailed assessment and 
repairs.  A majority of the more significant impacts were located in 
the debris critical zone section of the forward LO2 tank.  Following 
a detailed assessment of each damage location via tactile 
inspection, the damage sites were grouped by severity and 
Figure 31: Depletion Sensor 
Figure 32: Feed Through Connector 
Figure 33: Pin Contamination 
Figure 34: ET-124 Hail Damage Repairs 
 
 
location.  Next, unique engineering requirements were developed 
based on the as-built configuration (i.e. TPS thickness) and 
expected weather conditions for the planned (May-June) launch 
timeframe.  This was critical to the overall effort as the intent was to 
remove as little of the original TPS as possible while ensuring that 
the potential for ice formation and/or TPS liberation is minimized.  
The repairs (Figure 34) consisted of sand/blends for minor damage 
sites, local filling of more significant damage sites, and finally large 
manual sprays where the damage density was too great to address 
individually.  Each repair method was verified by first validating the 
process, and, then performing tests to the critical aero-thermal 
ascent environments.   
The restoration of ET-124 preserved a valuable flight asset and 
minimized what could have been a major impact to the Shuttle 
program manifest.  Post flight evaluation (Figure 35) showed that all of the hail damage repairs 
performed flawlessly with no debris events observed.  
Key lessons learned included: 
1. Think ‘outside the box’ to develop unique requirements and processes for unique 
circumstances. 
2. Rely on efficient and conservative testing to bound performance and minimize risk exposure.  
ET-137 Intertank Stringer Cracks 
Following the scrub of the initial STS-133 launch attempt due to launch commit criteria limit 
violation for GH2 leakage at the ground umbilical disconnect, a large TPS crack was observed 
adjacent to the LO2 / Intertank flange region (Figure 36).  Subsequent TPS removal revealed that 
the TPS crack was the result of cracks in the base of the Al-Li 2090 Intertank stringers where the 
stringers are mechanically attached to the Intertank skin panel.  Five stringers were observed to 
exhibit similar cracks.  An extensive investigation ensued to identify the root cause and assess / 
implement corrective actions.  The cause of the cracks was isolated to material lots that were 
shown to have reduced fracture toughness and uncharacteristic crack growth behavior.  Those 
factors, combined with higher assembly stresses on the LO2 tank end of the stringers, contributed 
to the observed cracks.  Nondestructive evaluation of the LH2 / Intertank flange confirmed crack-
free conditions.  The corrective action required a design change to the LO2 tank side stringer 
ends to incorporate reinforcements called radius blocks on the stringer feet (Figure 37).  The 
effectiveness of the radius block change was demonstrated by numerous component level tests 
and structural analyses.  Radius blocks were implemented on the remainder of the ET fleet and 
successfully flown with no issues. 
                   
                     
  
Figure 35: Hail Damage  
Repair Flight Performance 
Figure 36: STS-133 TPS Crack 
as Seen On Pad 
Figure 37: STS-133 Intertank 
Stringer Radius Block Repair 
 
 
Key lessons learned include: 
1. Ensure proper requirements and trending data are implemented for Al-Li materials used in 
a cryogenic environment 
2. Limit or avoid using Al-Li 2090 in a cryogenic environment. 
3. Use simple tests to fullest extent possible to rapidly develop engineering data to help 
guide the failure investigation and corrective actions.  
 
12BET BENEFITS TO SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM (SLS) 
Although the configuration and manufacturing details of the SLS are still being developed, a 
few key benefits to the SLS from the ET project are worth mention.  The most notable benefits 
are based on a decision by the SLS Program to have a core stage of the same diameter as the 
ET (27.6ft).  This provides the SLS with the option to use a vast array of ET tooling, facilities, and 
infrastructure not only at MAF and KSC, but also at potential vendors.  This can provide a 
potentially huge cost and schedule 
benefit.  At MAF, this tooling ranges 
from weld fixtures such as the 
Friction Stir Weld tool for longitudinal 
barrel welds (Figure 38) to handling 
fixtures that lift and move panels and 
subassemblies around the factory.  
Facilities built to accommodate tanks 
of this diameter can also be used 
with little to no modifications.  These 
include factory cells where cleaning, 
priming, and TPS are applied to 
those used to perform proof and 
protoflight testing.  Infrastructure 
designed specifically for ET diameter 
tanks include access platforms, 
wheeled transporters, barges, and 
storage cells at KSC.  A significant 
portion of these assets can be 
utilized or easily modified to support 
SLS. 
Along with direct use of existing 
hardware, the ET project developed 
technologies and processes can 
serve as starting points for SLS.  
Friction stir welding processes are a 
good example.  The process control 
parameters that define the weld 
schedules for various material 
combinations can be applied where 
applicable to SLS, reducing costly weld schedule developments.  Cleaning, priming, and 
automated TPS applications can also be utilized, along with significant databases (such as 
material properties for Al 2195 and TPS).  
Figure 38: Friction Stir Weld Tooling 
 
 
13BSUMMARY 
Over the past 30+ years, the Space Shuttle’s External Tank has changed very little in its 
outward appearance, but inwardly has been a program of continuous evolution.  Numerous 
challenges were presented to and met by the ET contractor and NASA team.  These challenges 
included achieving significant weight reductions (from 76,000 lbs to 58,500 lbs- nearly 25%) that 
permitted construction of the International Space Station in an orbit that enabled international 
cooperation. Weight savings were made possible by efficient structural design firmly anchored in 
testing and through use of new lightweight aluminum-lithium alloys.  Numerous welding 
advancements were made throughout the program, culminating in the first use of friction stir 
welding on a human-rated launch vehicle.  While ice and foam debris had always been a 
concern, following the Columbia accident significant debris reduction efforts were successful in 
reducing debris risks which culminated in the safe completion of the Shuttle Program. 
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